We advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria by solving two major open problems in the approximation of Nash equilibria and in the smoothed analysis of algorithms.
Introduction
Shortly after Spielman and Teng [24] proved that the smoothed complexity of the simplex algorithm with shadow-vertex pivoting rule is polynomial, a number of people [1] asked them whether their analysis can be extended to another classic algorithm, the Lemke-Howson algorithm [15] . Indeed, whether the smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson algorithm is polynomial has been the question most frequently raised during talks on smoothed analysis. The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the most popular method for computing a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game. It can be viewed as an extension of the simplex algorithm for linear programming and its worst-case complexity is also exponential [23] . As the simplex algorithm can be used to solve zero-sum two-player games [18] , a special subclass of two-player games, it is natural to conjecture that the Lemke-Howson algorithm has smoothed polynomial complexity like the simplex algorithm. Earlier and in the same spirit, it was asked [21] whether the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is in P as two-player zero-sum games and linear programming [13] .
Motivated by the result of Bárány, Vempala, and Vetta [2] that random two-player games can be solved in polynomial time, the following conjecture was included in a recent survey on smoothed analysis [25] :
Smoothed 2-NASH Conjecture: The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is in smoothed polynomial time.
A positive answer to this conjecture would provide an encouraging result to the computation of Nash equilibria.
However, so far, no polynomial smoothed analysis of the Lemke-Howson algorithm or any other algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in two-player games has been found.
In the final installment of a series of recent exciting developments initiated by Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [9] , Chen and Deng [4] proved that 2-NASH, the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is PPAD-complete. These results, despite unknowns about the PPAD complexity class [22] , provide strong evidence that this search problem might be hard for P.
These developments inspired us to attempt disproving the Smoothed 2-NASH Conjecture. In this regard, we formulated a competing conjecture that, 2-NASH is not in smoothed polynomial time unless PPAD ⊆ RP. A connection between the smoothed complexity and approximation complexity of Nash equilibria ( [25] , Proposition 9.12) then led us to the conjecture: 2-NASH is PPAD-hard to approximate in fully polynomial time.
By proving these two conjectures, we advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria. Not only do we answer the question about the smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson algorithm, but our investigation also enables us to settle an important open question about Nash equilibria by proving 2-NASH does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, unless PPAD ⊆ P.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the n O(log n/ 2 ) -time algorithm of Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [16] , the fastest algorithm known today for finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium, can be improved to poly(n, 1/ ). Also, it is unlikely that the average-case polynomial time result of [2] is extendible to the smoothed model.
Our results on approximation and smoothed complexity of Nash equilibria, together with those of [4, 9] on "exact" Nash equilibria, demonstrate computational difference between two-player games and their zero-sum specializations. These results may further encourage the study of the difference between local search and fixed-point computation.
Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Games
A two-player game ( or bimatrix game ) [20, 14, 15 ] is a non-cooperative game between two players in which the players have m and n choices of actions or pure strategies, respectively. The games can be specified by two m × n matrices A = (a i,j ) and B = (b i,j ). If the first player chooses action i and the second player chooses action j, then their payoffs are a i,j and b i,j , respectively. A mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution over its choices. The Nash Equilibrium Theorem [20, 19] on non-cooperative games when specialized to bimatrix games states that there exists a profile of possibly mixed strategies, called a Nash equilibrium, such that neither player can gain by changing his or her ( mixed ) strategy alone.
Let P n denote the set of all probability vectors in R n , i.e., non-negative vectors whose entries sum to 1.
Mathematically, a profile of mixed strategies can be expressed by two column vectors (x * ∈ P m , y * ∈ P n ). A Nash equilibrium is then a pair (x * , y * ) such that for all x ∈ P m and y ∈ P n , (x * ) T Ay * ≥ x T Ay * and (x * ) T By * ≥ (x * ) T By. (1) Computationally, one might settle with an approximate Nash equilibrium. An -relatively-approximate Nash equilibrium is a pair (x * , y * ) that satisfies
for all x ∈ P m , y ∈ P n , while an -approximate Nash equilibrium is a pair (x * , y * ) that satisfies (x * ) T Ay * ≥ x T Ay * − and (x * ) T By * ≥ (x * ) T By − .
The zero-sum two-player game [18] is a two-player game (A, B) with B = −A. It can be formulated as a linear program and can be solved in (weakly) polynomial time [13] .
Our Results and Approaches
Our main complexity-theoretic results are:
• It is PPAD-complete to compute a 1/n c -approximate Nash equilibrium of an n × n normalized 1 two-player game, for any fixed c > 0. Thus, no algorithm can compute an -approximate Nash equilibrium in time poly(n, 1/ ) for all , unless PPAD ⊆ P. • The smoothed complexity of the Lemke-Howson algorithm or in fact of any algorithm for bimatrix games is not poly(n, 1/σ) under perturbations with magnitude σ, unless PPAD ⊆ RP.
The first result implies that it is also PPAD-hard to find a 1/poly(n)-relatively-approximate Nash equilibrium in an n × n two-player game. It also implies that for any fixed c > 0, it remains PPAD-complete to compute the first (1 + c) log n-bits of an exact Nash equilibrium in a twoplayer game, even when the entries of the matrices that defined the game are integers of poly(n) magnitude. Thus, computing these leading bits is as hard as finding an exact Nash equilibrium of a rational two-player game. We emphasize that the PPAD-hard games constructed in [9, 5, 10, 4] can not be used to demonstrate that the problem of computing a 1/poly(n)-approximate Nash equilibrium in a {2, 3, 4}-player game is PPAD-hard. For example, we can compute in polynomial time a 1/n-approximate Nash equilibrium in the PPAD-hard two-player games constructed by Chen and Deng [4] , although they proved that finding a 2 −Θ(n) -approximate Nash equilibrium in these games is PPAD-complete. Thus, their proof does not apply to the search of 1/poly(n)-approximate Nash equilibria.
This limitation of [9, 5, 10, 4] is inherent in their choice of the PPAD-complete fixed-point problems from which they build their { 2, 3, 4 }-player games. The exponential dependency is the result of the fact that the approximation precision needed increases geometrically in the number of bits required to represent the coordinate of a point in the search space. In order to prove our new result, we need a reduction from a PPAD-complete fixed-point problem on hypergrids of a constant or polynomial side-length, which seems inconceivable in previous approaches.
As an instrumental step of our work, we introduce a family of high-dimensional discrete fixed-point problems, one associated with the (8 × 8 ... × 8) n-dimensional hypergrid.
Fortunately and somewhat surprisingly, the fixed-point problem is still PPAD-complete in this hypergrid with a seemingly very small side-length. We show this hypergrid has enough flexibility and structure to host the embedding of the proof structure of any PPAD problem.
However, high dimensionality come with their own challenges, as the original approach defines a fixed point to be a unit hypercube with 2 n points, which creates new difficulties to the efficiency of the reduction. As a critical step of our reduction, we prove a geometric lemma for finding a fixed point defined on n + 1 vertices of a unit hypercube. This lemma allows us to overcome the curse of dimensionality in reasoning about fixed points in high dimensions.
Notations
We will use bold lower-case Roman letters such as a to denote vectors and upper-case Roman letters such as A to denote matrices. We denote the i th -entry of a by a i and the
is the set of m × n matrices with real entries between a and b, (4) a|b is the dot-product of two vectors. (5) e i stands for the unit vector whose i th entry is equal to 1 and all other entries are zeros, (6) for x, y ∈ R and ∈ R + , by x = y ± , we mean y − ≤ x ≤ y + , (7) for p, q ∈ R n and ∈ R + , by p = q ± , we mean p i = q i ± , for all i, and (8) 
PPAD and Discrete Fixed Points
Following [17] , let TFNP denote the class of all NP search problems specified by total rela-
The complexity class PPAD [22] is sub-class of TFNP, containing problems polynomial-time reducible to: Definition 2.1 (LEAFD). The input instance of LEAFD is a pair (M, 0 n ) where M defines a polynomial-time Turing machine satisfying: (1) .
The output is a directed leaf of G other than 0 n . A vertex is a directed leaf if its out-degree plus in-degree equals one.
Problem Brouwer f
We say an integer function f (n) is well-behaved if it is polynomial-time computable and there exists an integer constant n 0 such that 3 ≤ f (n) ≤ n/2 for all n ≥ n 0 . For example, f 1 (n) = 3, f 2 (n) = n/2 , f 3 (n) = n/3 , and f 4 (n) = log n are all well-behaved functions.
Let 
r , the 2d output bits evaluated at p satisfy:
, if there exists an i such that p i = 0, letting i max = max { i | p i = 0 }, then the output bits satisfy the i th max case, otherwise ( ∀ i, p i = 0 and some p i is r i − 1 ), the output bits satisfy the d + 1 st case.
Definition 2.3 (Brouwer Color Assignment and Panchromatic Simplex). Let C be a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit with parameters d and r. It defines a color assignment
For a well-behaved function f and an integer n > 0, let d = n/f (n) and m = f (n). An input instance of BROUWER f is a pair (C, 0 n ), where C is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit with parameters d and r with r i = 2 m for all i : 1 ≤ i ≤ d. The output of the problem is then a panchromatic simplex of circuit C.
Both BROUWER f2 [3] and BROUWER f3 [9] are PPADcomplete. In section 5, we will establish the following theorem. It states that the complexity of finding a fixed point is independent of the shape or dimension of the search space.
Smoothed Analysis and Approximation
In the smoothed analysis [24] of two-player games, we consider perturbed games: For a pair of m × n matrices A
are chosen independently and uniformly from [−σ, σ] or from Gaussian distribution with variance σ 2 . We refer to these perturbations as σ-uniform and σ-Gaussian perturbations. An algorithm for bimatrix games has polynomial smoothed complexity [25] if it finds a Nash equilibrium of (A, B) in expected time poly(m, n, 1/σ), for all (A, B).
The following lemma shows that if the smoothed complexity of the bimatrix game, under uniform or Gaussian perturbations, is low, then one can quickly find an approximate Nash equilibrium. See the full version [7] for a proof. 
Approximating Nash Equilibria is Hard
In this section, we prove our main theorem: 
Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
In our analysis, we will use an alternative notion of approximate Nash equilibria as introduced in [9] : For a game G = (A, B) , let a i and b i denote the i th row of A and the i th column of B, respectively. An -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G is a pair (x * , y * ), such that for all j, k, b j |x * > b k |x * + ⇒ y * k = 0 and a j |y * > a k |y * + ⇒ x * k = 0.
We prove the following lemma in our full version [7] . 
From Brouwer to Approximate Nash
We reduce the search of a panchromatic simplex in an instance of BROUWER f1 ( which will be simply referred to as BROUWER in this section ) to the computation of a 1/n capproximate Nash equilibrium in a positively normalized bimatrix game, for some constant c > 0. Recall f 1 (n) = 3. Our reduction will use ideas and gadgets from [9, 4] .
However, we will need to develop several new techniques to meet the geometric and combinatorial challenges in the consideration of high-dimensional fixed-points.
Let U = (C, 0 3n ) be an input instance of BROUWER, which colors the hypergrid B n = Z n [0,7] with colors from { 1, ..., n, n + 1}. Let m be the smallest integer such that 2 m ≥ Size [C] and N = 2 6m+1 = 2K, where Size [C] is the number of gates plus the number of input and output variables in a Boolean circuit C. We first, in polynomial time, construct an N × N bimatrix game G U = (A U , B U ). Our construction ensures for = 1/K 3 , = 2 /(8N ),
From every -approximate Nash equilibrium of game G U , we can compute a panchromatic simplex P of circuit C in polynomial time.
By Lemma 4.4 it suffices to show
• Property A 2 : From each -well-supported Nash equilibrium of game G U , we can compute a panchromatic simplex P of circuit C in polynomial time.
We normalize G U to obtain G U = (A U , B U ) by setting
From Property A 2 , a panchromatic simplex P of C can be found in polynomial time from every N −10 -approximate Nash equilibrium of G U . By the following lemma, ( proof omitted ), we can extend the constant 10 to any fixed c > 0.
Lemma 4.5. If the problem of finding an n −c -approximate Nash equilibrium in an n × n positively normalized game is PPAD-complete for some constant c = c 0 > 0, then the problem is PPAD-complete for every constant c > 0.
Overcome the Curse of Dimensionality
We now prove a key geometric lemma for finding a panchromatic simplex in order to overcome the curse of dimensionality. Our reduction will then build on this lemma.
For a ∈ R + , let π(a) = max{ i | 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and i < a } be the largest integer in [0 : 7] that is smaller than a. Let E n = { z 1 , z 2 ...z n , z n+1 } where z i = e i /K 2 and z n+1 = − 1≤i≤n e i /K 2 . We encode the i th color by vector z i .
For p ∈ R n + , let q = π(p) be the lattice point in B n with Proof. We first prove that Q = { q k = π(p k ), 1 ≤ k ≤ n 3 } is accommodated, and |Q | ≤ n + 1. As sequence {p k } is strictly increasing, {q k } is non-decreasing. Since n/K 1, there exists at most one k i , for each i, such that q ki i = q ki−1 i + 1, which implies that Q is accommodated. Moreover, as {q k } is non-decreasing, |Q | ≤ n + 1. As Q ⊂ Q , Q is also accommodated and |Q| ≤ n + 1.
Definition 4.6 (Well-Positioned Points
Because 1/K 2 1/K 1, there is at most one k i , for each i, such that p ki i is poorly-positioned. Since every poorly-positioned point has at least one poorly-positioned component, |I B (S)| ≤ n and |I G (S)| ≥ n 3 − n.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, let W i denote the number points in q k : k ∈ I G (S) that is colored i by circuit C.
Figure 1. Constraint P[T]
It suffices to show that W i > 0 for all i in order prove Q is a panchromatic simplex, Let r G = k∈IG(S) ξ(p k ) and r B = k∈IB (S) r k . Since |I B (S)| ≤ n and r k ∞ ≤ 1/K 2 , we have
Assume by way of contradiction that one of W i is zero:
(ii) W t = 0 for some 1 ≤ t ≤ n: We assert W n+1 ≤ n 2 /2, for otherwise, |r G t | > n 2 /(2K 2 ) n/K 2 + O( ), contradicting with (2). Suppose W i * = max 1≤i≤n+1 W i , then W i * ≥ n 2 − 1 and i * = n + 1. So r G i * ≥ (n 2 − 1 − n 2 /2)/K 2 n/K 2 + O( ), contradicting with (2).
Gadget Games and Constraints
To construct game G U , we transform a prototype game G * = (A * , B * ), a zero-sum game to be defined, by adding "gadget" games: We will build a collection of gadgets
, as shown in Figure 2 .
We define a function named BUILDGAME that takes a valid collection (will be defined) of gadgets S U and returns a bimatrix game G U = (A U , B U ) = BUILDGAME(S U ) as:
Nodes, Values and Capacities
We choose two sets V A and V I with |V A | = |V I | = K. It will become clear what these elements are. So, don't worry too much about them now. We call elements in V A arithmetic nodes and elements in V I internal nodes.
Below, we will always use v to denote a node in V A and w to denote a node in V I . We also pick two one-to-one correspondences C A and C I to index these sets:
Let (x ∈ P N , y ∈ P N ) be a pair of probability vectors.
. We refer to x[v] and x C [v] as the value and capacity, respectively, of v in (x, y) . Similarly, the value and capacity of each w ∈ V I is y[w] = y 2t−1 and y C [w] = y 2t−1 + y 2t , respectively, where t = C I (w).
The Prototype Game and its Properties
Our prototype G * = (A * , B * ) is the game of Matching Pennies with parameter M = 2 18m+1 = 2K 3 : A * is a K × K block-diagonal matrix where each diagonal block is a 2 × 2 matrix of all M 's, and B * = −A * . All games we will consider below belong to the following class: Every equilibrium (x, y) of G * enjoys a nice property:
Let P denote the following constraint on ( x, y) :
Lemma 4.9 (Nearly Uniform Capacities). If G ∈ L, then every 1.0-well-supported Nash equilibrium (x, y) of game G satisfies constraint P for = 2 −18m = 1/K 3 .
Gadgets and their Constraints
We use all the nine types of gadgets designed in [4] for our construction:
Among them, G ∧ , G ∨ and G ¬ are logic gadgets. They will be used to simulate the logic gates in the Boolean circuit C. Associated with probability vectors (x, y), the value of v 1 , v 2 , v, c, w) is a 6-tuple that implements an arithmetic or logic constraint P[T ], which requires the values of nodes v, v 1 and v 2 to satisfy certain functional relationship. The requirements for logic gadgets will hold exactly and the requirements for arithmetic ones will hold approximately. By Figure 1 , the logic constraints implemented by the logic gadgets are effective only when the values of their input nodes are representations of binary bits. In gadget T , v 1 ∈ V A ∪ {nil} and v 2 ∈ V A ∪ {nil} are the first and second input nodes, respectively, v ∈ V A is the output node, and w ∈ V I is the internal node of the gadget. Parameter c is only used in G ζ and G ×ζ gadgets: when type G = G ζ , we have c ∈ R and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1/K − ; when G = G ×ζ , 0 ≤ c ≤ 1; otherwise, c = nil. T = (G, v 1 , v 2 , v, w, c) and
Definition 4.10 (Valid Collection). A collection S of gadgets is valid if for each pair
For every valid collection S, BUILDGAME(S) satisfies the following constraints: gadgets, and (x, y) is an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of BUILDGAME(S), then for all T ∈ S, constraint P[T ] as defined in Figure 1 is satisfied by (x, y) .
Proof.
A similar theorem is proved in [4] , also see [7] .
Construction of the Game G U
Our objective is to design a bimatrix game G U to encode n 3 points in R n [0, 8] , to simulate the π function, and the boolean circuit C so that in every -well-supported equilibrium of G U , the sum of the n 3 vectors as given in Lemma 4.7 is close to zero, i.e., O( ). To achieve this, We build a valid collection S U of gadgets to define the bimatrix game. Then Q defined in Lemma 4.7 is a panchromatic simplex of C, which can be computed in polynomial time.
Let us define some notations that will be useful. Let S be a valid collection of gadgets. A node v ∈ V A ( or node w ∈ V I ) is said to be unused if none of the gadgets in S uses v (or w) as its output node (or internal node). Suppose T ∈ S is a gadget such that S ∪ {T } is valid. We will use INSERT(S, T ) to denote the insertion of T into S.
To encode these n 3 points, let {v k i } 1≤k≤n 3 ,1≤i≤n be n 4 distinguished nodes in set V A . We start with S U = ∅ and insert a number of gadgets into it so that, in every -wellsupported Nash equilibrium (x, y) of G U , values of these nodes encode n 3 points S = { p k : 1 ≤ k ≤ n 3 } in R n [0, 8] that approximately satisfy all the conditions of 
Figure 2. Matrices L[T] and R[T]
Our reduction starts with the 2D problem BROUWER f2 . To simplify the proof, we modify the definition of problem BROUWER f as follows: In the original definition, each valid Brouwer-mapping circuit C defines a color assignment from the search space to {1..., d + 1}. In this section, T,t,a,b) we replace the color d + 1 by a special color "red". In another word, if the output bits of C evaluated at p satisfy the d + 1 st case, then Color C [p] ="red".
The basic idea of our reduction is to iteratively embed an instance of BROUWER f2 into one for a space one dimension higher. We use the following concept to describe such embedding processes. A triple T = (C, d, r) is a coloring triple if r ∈ Z d with r i ≥ 7 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d and C is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit with parameters d and r. We let Size [C] denote the number of gates plus the number of input and output variables in a circuit C.
Our embedding is defined by a sequence of three polynomial-time transformations: L 1 (T, t, u), L 2 (T, u), and L 3 (T, t, a, b) . They embed a coloring triple T into a larger T such that from every panchromatic simplex of T , one can find a panchromatic simplex of T efficiently.
Both L 1 and L 2 are very simple operations. Given a T = (C, d, r) and two integers 1 ≤ t ≤ d, u > r t , L 1 (T, t, u) pads dimension t to size u, i.e., it builds a new coloring triple T = (C , d, r ) with r t = u and r i = r i , ∀ i : 1 ≤ i = t ≤ d. For u ≥ 7, L 2 (T, u) adds a dimension to T by constructing T = (C , d + 1, r ) such that r d+1 = u and t, a, b) is the one that does all the hard work.
Lemma 5.1 (L 3 (T, t, a, b) : Snake Embedding). Given a coloring triple T = (C, d, r) and an integer 1 ≤ t ≤ d, if r t = a(2b + 1) + 5 for some integers a, b ≥ 1, then we can construct a new coloring triple T = (C , d + 1, r ) that satisfies the following two conditions. (1) r t = a + 5, r d+1 = 4b + 3, and r i = r i for all In the construction of C , we use a snake-pattern W ⊂ A d+1 r to realize the longer t th dimension of A d r in the twodimensional space defined by the shorter t th and d + 1 st dimensions, see Figure 4 and 5. In Figure 5 , ψ is a onto map ( defined in the full version [7] ) from W to A d r . The proof of Lemma 5.1 can be found in [7] .
By repeatedly applying the three operations L 1−3 , we can prove Theorem 2.5. The proof is relatively procedural and can be found in [7] .
Extensions and Open Questions
As the fixed-points and Nash equilibria are fundamental to many other search and optimization problems, our results and techniques may have a broader scope of applications and implications.
Our hardness results can be naturally extended to both r-player games [20] and r-graphical games [12] , for every fixed r ≥ 3. Recently, there are a few exciting extensions of our work: Huang and Teng [11] applied our result to show that the problem of finding a market equilibrium in a Leontief exchange economy does not have a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme, unless PPAD ⊆ P. They also show that the smoothed complexity of neither Scarf's general market equilibrium algorithm nor any other algorithm for Leontief market is likely polynomial. Chen, Teng, and Valiant [8] solved one of our conjectures by extending the PPAD-hardness result to the approximation of win-lose bimatrix games. In addition, we proved in [6] that the problem of computing a 1/poly(n)-approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-complete for a sparse bimatrix game (A, B) in which each row and column of A and B contains at most a constant number of nonzero entries.
There remains a complexity gap on the approximation of Nash equilibria in two-player games: Lipton, Markakis and Mehta [16] show that an -approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in n O(log n/ 2 ) -time, while this paper shows that no algorithm can find an -approximate Nash equilibrium in poly(n, 1/ )-time for of order 1/poly(n), unless PPAD ⊆ P. However, our hardness result does not cover the case when is a constant between 0 and 1, or of order 1/polylog(n). Naturally, it is unlikely that finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete when is an absolute constant, for otherwise, all the search problems in PPAD would be solvable in n O(log n) -time, due to the result of [16] .
Thinking optimistically, we would like to see the following conjectures to be true.
Conjecture 1 (PTAS for NASH).
There is an O(n k+ −c )time algorithm for finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, for some constants c and k.
Conjecture 2 (Smoothed 2-NASH: Constant σ).
There is an algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game with smoothed complexity O(n k+σ −c ) under perturbations with magnitude σ, for some constants c and k.
We also conjecture that Theorem 4.3 remains true without any complexity assumption on PPAD. A positive answer would extend the result of Savani and von Stengel [23] to smoothed games.
